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Taxing the Opposition: Cactus League Attendance and the Efficiency
of the ‘Cubs Tax’
The economic justification of publicly funded sports facilities has been one of the most
active areas of research in sports economics. Potential channels through which the
presence of a sports team might provide economic benefits include increases in
employment (Coates & Humphreys 2003), hotel occupancy (Lavoie & Rodriguez 2005;
Porter 1999), tourism (Baumann, Matheson, & Muroi, 2009), sales tax (Coates &
Depken, 2006; Baade, Baumann, & Matheson, 2008), property values (Dehring,
Depken, & Ward, 2007), and apartment rents (Coates, Humphreys, & Zimbalist, 2006). 
With the exception of property value analysis, where the economic analysis is more
mixed (Carlino & Coulson, 2004; Tu, 2005), the few studies that have provided eco-
nomic justification for publicly funding stadiums are often reports conducted by con-
sulting firms hired by the groups hoping to attract a professional sports team to their
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Abstract
In 2010, a plan to finance a new spring training stadium for the Cubs through a tick-
et surcharge on all games in the Cactus League was proposed. We find that the Cubs
increase attendance when they are the away team by about 37%. Thus, the surcharge
would be economically justified as long as the price elasticity of tickets is less than
0.32, which many prior studies find to be the case. This tax provides one of the few
examples in which the cost of a subsidized stadium would be born primarily by the
group that benefits the most from the arrival of the subsidized team. 
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city by providing a subsidized stadium (Coates & Humphreys, 2008). More important-
ly, the channels mentioned above that bring economic benefits to local economies lack
the ability to fully justify the public subsidy, and some studies even find negative
impact on local employment and tax revenue (Baade & Dye, 1990). 
In this paper, we examine an alternative approach to financing a sports stadium in
which the construction of the stadium would be funded by a surcharge on all ticket
sales in the league. In 2010, the Cubs felt that their current spring training stadium in
Mesa, Arizona, was inadequate, and they began to explore options for getting a new
stadium. Like many teams looking for a way to get someone else to pay for a new sta-
dium, they threatened to relocate to Naples, Florida, that had offered to pay for a new
stadium for the Cubs (Nelson, 2012a). Unlike if the threat had been to obtain a new
stadium in Glendale or Tucson, this threat would involve the team leaving the Cactus
League for the Grapefruit League. Thus, the other teams in the Cactus League would
no longer play the Cubs.
One proposal designed to keep the Cubs in the Cactus League was to pay for the new
stadium using the funds generated by an 8% surcharge on all Cactus League tickets,
even those games that didn’t involve the cubs (Walsh, 2010). The Cubs have a large fan
base living in a cold-weather climate that is willing to travel to Arizona to see the Cubs
play. When they come to Arizona, the Cubs fans attend games both at the Cubs’ stadi-
um as well as games played in other teams’ stadiums, most of which are in the Phoenix
metropolitan area. As a result, the surcharge placed on the price of opposing team’s
tickets may be compensated by the increased attendance that these teams experience
when playing the Cubs. This may provide one of the few cases in which the costs of a
subsidized stadium are born primarily by the groups that benefit the most directly
from the stadium.
Our analysis is based on the attendance at all Cactus League games during the 2007-
2010 spring-training seasons. We include a set of measures that control for the quali-
ty of the game and test the degree to which attendance increases when the Cubs are
playing. We find that when the Cubs are the visiting team attendance increases by 37%.
Based on some basic calculation, we estimate that the 8% surcharge on opposing
team’s tickets would have been economically justified as long as the price elasticity for
baseball tickets is less than 0.32. We provide some discussion at the end of the paper
about what the actual price elasticity might be and find that about half of the estimates
from past studies for the price elasticity of baseball attendance are less than 0.32.
Literature Review
This paper builds on a large set of papers that examine different factors that influence
attendance at sporting events, in particular attendance at baseball games. Typically,
studies of baseball choose a number of variables that should influence attendance such
as team success (Fort & Roseman, 1999; Rascher, 1999; Meehan, Nelson, & Richardson,
2007), playing an interleague opponent or team rival (Butler, 2002; Gillette & Palmer,
2007; Davis, 2009; McDonald & Rascher, 2000), or whether a certain star player is play-
ing (Rascher, 1999; Gitter & Rhoads, 2011). Also of importance might be weather
(Bruggink & Eaton, 1996; Meehan et al., 2007), promotions (Gifis & Sommers, 2006),
or the availability of alcohol (Chupp, Stephenson, & Taylor, 2007). Many of these fac-
tors are not relevant to our study. For example, alcohol sales are not limited and teams
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rarely run promotions during spring training. Team success during spring training is
unlikely to be important; however, the team’s performance during the last year is like-
ly to be relevant. We control for factors such as the quality of the stadium, the type of
opponent, and whether the game was played at night or on the weekend.
Spring training games have a lot in common with minor league baseball games. The
stadium sizes are similar to those that accommodate AA or AAA baseball teams as
opposed to major league teams. Although the fans may not care about the outcome of
the game as much as they do for a major league game (Siegfried & Eisenberg, 1980),
Gitter and Rhoads (2010) have found evidence that winning percentage does have a
positive impact on attendance for minor league teams. 
One of the only papers to examine the factors that influence attendance at spring
training games is Donihue, Findlay, and Newberry (2007), who use data from the
Grapefruit League in Florida in 2002. They find that the team’s record during the pre-
vious year, the size of the city, and the size of the stadium all influence attendance. One
major difference between the Grapefruit League and the Cactus League is that the
games in the Grapefruit League are spread out all over the state of Florida while the
games in the Cactus league are mostly in the Phoenix Metropolitan area. In Appendix
Table A1 we provide a list of the locations and distance from Phoenix of each team’s
stadium in the Cactus League.
Data
The data that we use in this paper come from box scores and standings available at
espn.com. These measures include how many games behind the home and away team
are on the day of the game, the number of championships the team has won in the past
three years, and whether the teams are division rivals. There is also a measure of
whether the game involves split squads, a unique feature of spring training games where
only a part of the team is sent to play. We also have information on the date and time
of the game. Additionally, we use data from baseball-reference.com to calculate the
number of players on each team who played on the All-Star team the year previous.
Other sources of our data are baseball websites such as springtrainingmagazine.com
and springtrainingonline.com that include stadium characteristics and other measures
of the quality of the game. These websites specialize in news and information regard-
ing both leagues, including pages on specific teams that record the capacity and age of
each stadium and how long each team has been at the stadium. 
These websites also provide information on ticket prices. However, only a few teams
charge for “premium” games, so that a team’s ticket prices vary little during a season.1
In addition, the ticket prices at a particular stadium vary based on seat quality and
while these websites provide information on prices by section, no information is given
on the number of seats in each section. Other researchers also discuss the difficulty of
putting proper weights on the ticket prices by seat quality and admit this as a weakness
when using ticket prices in an attendance regression. 
In Appendix Table A2 we provide an example of the within stadium variation in
price using data on ticket prices from the 2010 season for each team. In terms of vari-
ation across teams, the lowest price tickets vary across teams from $4-$8 and the high-
est price tickets vary from $17-$40. There is also considerable variation across prices
of tickets for a specific team with prices ranging from $7 to $26 for Cubs games (with
5 different categories of pricing) and $7 to $40 at Dodgers games (with 6 different cat-
egories of pricing).
Results
The empirical approach and control variables that we include are similar to Donihue,
Findlay, and Newberry (2007). We use a log-linear regression specification where the
dependent variable is the log of attendance. This provides a natural interpretation to
our coefficients that can be easily compared to the effect of the 8% surcharge on each
ticket. The drawback of the log-linear specification is that the coefficients of any bina-
ry variables require a slight transformation to be interpretable as a percent change. In
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Table 1. Summary statistics.
Cubs w/o Cubs All
Stadium
Attendance 10,067 6,427 6,989
(2593.3) (3163.2) (3349.7)
Capacity 11,799 10,921 11,057
(1569.7) (2225.5) (2160.0)
Years at Location 11.87 11.41 11.48
(5.02) (6.66) (6.43)
Stadium Age 15.63 19.27 18.71
(14.05) (20.18) (19.40)
Quality of Game
Split Squad 0.23 0.20 0.20
(0.42) (0.40) (0.40)
Total Division Championships 1.96 1.06 1.20
(1.09) (0.97) (1.04)
Division Rivals 0.13 0.23 0.21
(0.33) (0.42) (0.41)
Total Number of All-Stars 5.40 3.99 4.21
(3.15) (1.74) (2.08)
Games Behind-Home 8.94 11.96 11.49
(9.29) (9.63) (9.64)
Games Behind-Away 8.72 11.94 11.44
(9.21) (9.62) (9.62)
Time of Game
Evening 0.03 0.07 0.06
(0.16) (0.26) (0.25)
Weekend 0.49 0.48 0.48
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
N 112 614 726
Notes: The “Cubs” column includes all games in which the Cubs are either the home
or away team. The “w/o Cubs” column includes all games in which the Cubs were not
playing.
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all of the tables we use the approach based on Halovorsen and Palmquist (1980) to
report the percent change in attendance for each coefficient, which involve exponenti-
ating each of the coefficients. Lemke, Leonard, and Tlhokwane (2010) find very little
difference in the results of using the log or levels of attendance and as a robustness
check we will provide similar evidence.
The control variables that we include in our model include characteristics of the sta-
dium and the quality of the game (listed in Table 1). Our primary specification is a
combined measure of the quality of the two teams. As an additional approach we
include each of these measures separately for the home and visiting team. Since the
teams in the Cactus League mostly play in the Phoenix metropolitan area, variables
describing the home team’s metropolitan area are not very useful and are not included. 
In Table 2, we provide the main results of our paper. These regressions include all of
the control variables from Table 1 as well as year and week-in-season fixed effects. In
the first column, we include a dummy variable for whether the Cubs are one of the
teams playing in the game (with no distinction between whether they are the home or
away team). We also include separate dummies for the Los Angeles Dodgers and the
Arizona Diamondbacks, two of the other most popular teams in the Cactus League.
Our main coefficient of interest is thus interpreted as the difference in attendance
when the Cubs are playing and when both teams consist of one of the other 13 teams
in the Cactus League (excluding the Cubs, Dodgers, and Diamondbacks).
The coefficient in the first column of Table 2 indicates that games in which the Cubs
are playing have attendance that is 41% higher than the typical game (in which one of
the three most popular teams are not playing). In comparison, games in which the
Dodgers are playing have attendance that is 27% higher and games in which Arizona
is playing are 20% higher than the typical game involving other teams. 
In the second column of Table 2, we split our results to show the difference in atten-
dance for games in which the Cubs are playing in their own stadium and those in an
opposing team’s stadium. We find that while the attendance at Cubs games is higher
when they are playing in their own stadium, the Cubs still produce a 37% increase in
attendance while they are playing in opposing team’s stadiums. In column 3, we enter
each of the controls separately for the home and visiting team. The result is very sim-
ilar, with the increase in attendance during Cubs games in other stadiums being 36%.
Our other covariates have similar results to those found by Donihue, Findlay, and
Newberry (2007). We find that games on the weekend, at night, and towards the end
of spring training generally have better attendance, while games between poorer qual-
ity teams generally have lower attendance. All of our other covariates match those of
Doninue, Findlay, and Newberry except for years at location, where we find an increase
in attendance of about 2% for every year.2
The major difference in the coefficients for our control variables is the effect of tick-
et prices. The coefficients from Donihue, Findlay, and Newberry imply an elasticity of
-1.2. While our empirical models in Table 2 do not include price as a control, when we
include the log of price as a control variable, the coefficient on the log of the price of
tickets suggests an implied price elasticity of -0.112 (with a standard error of 0.160). 
A major challenge with this price elasticity is that while prices during the regular
MLB season vary from game to game, spring training ticket prices, with the exception
of a few teams, are constant throughout a particular spring training season. In order
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to exploit the variation across seasons for each team, we also estimate the same regres-
sion as before, but with team fixed effects. In this case, our estimates provide an
implied elasticity of -0.135 but this estimate is less precise with a standard error of





Cubs Home 0.460** 0.463**
[0.124] [0.133]
{58.4%} {58.9%}






Arizona Home 0.199** 0.180*
[0.041] [0.069]
{22.0%} {19.7%}






Dodgers Home 0.375** 0.397**
[0.088] [0.102]
{45.5%} {48.7%}
Dodgers Away 0.184** 0.164*
[0.051] [0.057]
{20.2%} {17.8%}
Observations 726 726 726
R-squared 0.660 0.664 0.668
Notes: Each regression contains controls for all of the variables listed in Table 1 along
with year and week-in-season fixed effects, rain and temperature controls, and a
dummy for if the stadium is in Tucson. In column 3, we include these control vari-
ables separately for the home and away team. Standard errors in parenthesis and per-
cent change in attendance in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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0.437. In the next section, we provide some additional insight about the price elastic-
ity of baseball game attendance based on estimates from past studies.
Was the Tax Justified?
The benefit principle of taxation implies that taxes should be paid by those who ben-
efit from the project. In a stadium setting the most obvious way to meet this measure
of equity would be to impose a user fee on the consumers attending the game.
However, this approach defeats the purpose to the team of getting someone else to pay
for the stadium. Other taxes have attempted to tax businesses that benefit from the sta-
dium especially those related to tourism such as rental cars, hotels, and restaurants.
The surcharge on all games in the Cactus League provides a potentially more equitable
tax since the costs of the tax are born by some of the groups that stand to benefit the
most by keeping the Cubs in the Cactus League.
The other teams in the Cactus League objected to the tax on their games. Four teams
boycotted the 2010 Cactus League kickoff breakfast in protest of the tax (Walsh, 2010).
Depending on the elasticity of demand for tickets, the other teams should have been
willing to pay for the Cubs stadium if it meant keeping the Cubs as a possible away
team. There are 16 teams in the Cactus League, so the Cubs are the away team once
every 15 games.3 By dividing the increased attendance when the Cubs are the away
team (37%) by 15, we find that having the Cubs in the league would raise average
attendance across all games by 2.5%. The tax would have increased prices of all tickets
by 8% (even for games not involving the Cubs). Thus in order for the tax to have had
a neutral effect on attendance, the price elasticity of demand for baseball tickets would
need to be less than 0.32.
As noted in the previous section, the type of price variation available in the spring
training leagues makes it difficult to estimate the exact price elasticity of tickets in the
Cactus League using our data. In addition, since the stadiums where the Cactus League
teams play are so close together (making them easy substitutes for one another), esti-
Table 3. Summary of past estimates of price elasticity of baseball attendance
Study League Years Empirical Strategy N Elasticity
Donihue, Findlay, Grapefruit 2002 Semi-log,  298 -1.25
and Newberry League Censored 
(2007) Tobit model.
Winfree, McCluskey, MLB 1963-1998 Non-linear 884 -0.055
Mittelhammer, and GLS
Fort (2004)
Hadley and Poitras MLB 1991-2001 Partial-log 308 -0.210
(2002)
Depken (2000) MLB 1990-1996 Log-log 174 -0.454
Coffin (1996) MLB 1962-1975 Level-Level 740 -0.106
Coffin (1996) MLB 1976-1992 Level-Level 740 -0.677
Domazlicky and Kerr MLB 1969-1980 Log-log 252 -0.230
(1990)
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mates based on variation in prices across teams would not provide an accurate estimate
of how much attendance would change if all teams raised their prices at the same time. 
To provide some additional insight about the elasticity of demand for baseball tick-
ets, we summarize some of the estimates from past studies on baseball attendance in
Table 3. For each study, we include the league, years, empirical strategy, and estimated
elasticity of demand. We find that four of the seven studies that are included in the list
in Table 3 find an elasticity of demand that is smaller than the 0.32 required for the
Cubs tax to have been economically justified. In addition, the lower estimates for the
elasticity of demand are based on those studies that use the most years of data.
Ultimately, the proposed surcharge tax on all Cactus League tickets was not used to
finance the Cubs stadium. Instead, Proposition 420 was passed in November of 2010
allowing the city to spend up to $84 million on the stadium and an additional $15 mil-
lion on other infrastructure. The funding would come from a bond that would be paid
off using unspecified general taxes and funds from selling city-owned land (Nelson,
2010). 
Conclusion
It has been rare for past studies to find evidence of an economic justification for pub-
licly provided sports stadiums. Some of the channels through which this economic
justification is thought to operate are through employment, tourism revenue, sales tax,
and property value. All of these are situations in which local citizens who may or may
not directly enjoy viewing the sporting events might indirectly benefit from the eco-
nomic effects of having a nearby sports stadium. 
In contrast, we examine the economic justification for a tax in which other teams
that participate in a particular league are asked to help finance the stadium for anoth-
er team in the league. We find that the proposed Cubs tax of an 8% surcharge on all
tickets in the Cactus League may have been economically justified because other teams
experience a large increase in their own-stadium attendance when they play the Cubs.
We find that a similar argument could be made about other popular teams such as the
Diamondbacks and Dodgers. The Cubs tax possibly provides one of the few examples
in which the cost of a subsidized stadium would be born primarily by a group that
benefits greatly from the presence of the subsidized team.
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Endnotes
1 In the Cactus League, only four teams charged for premium games: the White Sox (5 games),
Giants (Fri-Sun), Dodgers (5), and Reds (6). 
2 To make Table 2 more compact and the main results more transparent, we only report the
coefficients for our main variables of interest. We have included the coefficients for most of the
other control variables in Appendix Table A3. 
3 At the time of the study there were only 15 teams in the Cactus League, however, the
Cincinnati Reds moved to Arizona in the spring of 2010. While they were not included in the
estimation that determined the impact of the Cubs, their being in the league lessened the per-
team impact, as each team plays the Cubs less often.
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Table A1. Cactus Team Location.
Team Stadium City Distance to 
Phoenix 
(miles)
Arizona Diamondbacks Salt River Fields Scottsdale 9.11
Chicago Cubs HoHoKam Stadium Mesa 14.19
Chicago White Sox Camelback Ranch Glendale 8.98
Cincinnati Reds Goodyear Ballpark Goodyear 16.4
Cleveland Indians Goodyear Ballpark Goodyear 16.4
Colorado Rockies Salt River Fields Scottsdale 9.11
Kansas City Royals Surprise Stadium Surprise 22.76
Los Angeles Angels Tempe Diablo Stadium Tempe 7.9
Los Angeles Dodgers Camelback Ranch Glendale 8.98
Milwaukee Brewers Maryvale Baseball Park Phoenix 0
Oakland Athletics Phoenix Municipal Stadium Phoenix 0
San Diego Padres Peoria Sports Complex Peoria 13.13
San Francisco Giants Scottsdale Stadium Scottsdale 9.11
Seattle Mariners Peoria Sports Complex Peoria 13.13
Texas Rangers Surprise Stadium Surprise 22.76
Notes: Distance is calculated using Google Maps Distance Calculator.
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Taxing the Oppostion: Cactus League Attendance and the Efficiency of the ‘Cubs Tax’
Table A3. Coefficients from control variables in Table 2.
(1) (2)
Capacity (logged) 0.919*** 0.874***
[0.209] [0.242]
Years At Location 0.025** 0.026***
[0.008] [0.008]
Stadium Age -0.006** -0.006**
[0.002] [0.002]
Split Squad -0.083** -0.088**
[0.028] [0.028]
Total Division Championships -0.028 -0.029
[0.022] [0.023]
Division Rivals -0.014 -0.011
[0.018] [0.018]
Total Number of All-Stars 0.002 0.002
[0.006] [0.006]
Games Behind-Home -0.008*** -0.007**
[0.002] [0.002]








Notes: These are the coefficients for the main control variables in the first two
columns of Table 2. Not reported are the year and week-in-season fixed effects.
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Cubs Home 3,259* 3,369*
[1,084] [1,131]




Arizona Home 1,393** 1,204*
[190.8] [405.2]




Dodgers Home 2,656* 2,873*
[855.3] [938.7]
Dodgers Away 1,057** 867.3*
[274.4] [340.9]
Observations 726 726 726
R-squared 0.655 0.659 0.668
Notes: Each regression contains controls for all of the variables listed in Table 1 along
with year and week-in-season fixed effects, rain and temperature controls, and a
dummy for if the stadium is in Tucson. In column 3, we include these control vari-
ables separately for the home and away team. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
